AIDS Quarantine in England and the United States by Elseberry, Ronald
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 10
Number 1 Fall 1986 Article 6
1-1-1986
AIDS Quarantine in England and the United States
Ronald Elseberry
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ronald Elseberry, AIDS Quarantine in England and the United States, 10 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 113 (1986).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol10/iss1/6
AIDS Quarantine in England and the
United States
By RONALD ELSBERRY
Member of the Class of 1987
I. INTRODUCTION
The World Health Organization has declared acquired immune defi-
ciency syndrome (AIDS) a world health crisis, "a health disaster of pan-
demic proportions." 1 Concern over the spread of this epidemic disease
prompted England to apply provisions of its 1984 Public Health Act to
AIDS in March 1985, allowing a judge to order an AIDS patient2 de-
tained in a hospital if the judge is satisfied that the patient would not take
adequate precautions to prevent the spread of the disease if not detained.'
In the United States, some health officials, legislators, and individuals
have similarly proposed AIDS quarantine4 measures because of increas-
1. Where is Research?, San Francisco Chron., Sept. 10, 1985, at 38, col. 1; Altman, U.N.
Agency Begins Global Push on AIDS, San Francisco Chron., Nov. 21, 1986, at 1, col. 6. The
World Health Organization, a Geneva-based agency of the United Nations that coordinates
research and health programs among its 166 member countries, estimates 100,000 people have
contracted AIDS worldwide, one million people have AIDS-related disorders, and up to 10
million people are infected with the AIDS virus. Id. at 18, col. 4. See infra notes 74-79 and
accompanying text.
2. This Note uses the term "AIDS patient" to refer to persons actually diagnosed with
the disease because they have contracted one or more of the "opportunistic infections" associ-
ated with AIDS. See infra note 69 and accompanying text. The term "AIDS carrier" refers to
both AIDS patients and to persons who have been exposed to the AIDS virus as determined by
a blood test that detects the presence of antibodies to the virus. Although not all individuals
who carry AIDS antibodies also carry the virus in their blood, no practically available test can
isolate the presence of the virus. All those with AIDS antibodies may also carry the virus, and
are therefore referred to as "AIDS carriers." See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
3. Public Health Act, 1984, ch. 22, §§ 35, 37, 38, 43, 44. See infra notes 229-232 and
accompanying text. Over a year earlier, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the
rights of AIDS patients, but considered "that it may be necessary, in certain well-defined cir-
cumstances, to limit the rights of patients where they would involve a danger to public health."
35 INT'L DIG. HEALTH LEGIS. 473 (1984).
4. As applied to persons, the term "quarantine" technically means the restriction of the
activities of well persons who have been exposed to a communicable disease through contact
with an infected person. The purpose of such restrictions is to prevent disease transmission
during the incubation period. The term "isolation" is used to refer to separation of infected
persons during the period of communicability to prevent transmission of the infectious agent to
others. CONTROL OF COMMUNICABLE DIsEAsEs IN MAN 414-15 (A. Benenson 13th ed.
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ing concern and fear about AIDS.' These proposals stem, in part, from
scattered uncertainty about how AIDS is transmitted6 and from media
reports of AIDS victims having sexual contact with partners who are
unaware of their disease.7 A Florida judge has stated that AIDS is the
modern day equivalent of leprosy: "The public has reacted to the disease
with hysteria. Reported accounts indicate that victims of AIDS have
been faced with social censure, embarrassment and discrimination in
nearly every phase of their lives, jobs, education, and housing."'
Because AIDS is not casually transmitted and has an incubation pe-
riod of up to seven years,9 applying quarantine measures to the epidemic
requires an approach different from that taken in the past for other con-
tagious diseases such as tuberculosis or smallpox. 10 The English law pro-
vides that the need for detention does not arise unless the patient will
infect others either through sexual relations or by direct contact with
blood, as in intravenous drug use.1" Any other laws that would quaran-
tine all AIDS patients or carriers 2 may be overbroad and ineffective."3
In the United States the use of quarantine to protect the public from
AIDS may violate the quarantined person's fourteenth amendment rights
of substantive due process, procedural due process, and equal protection,
as well as his or her right to privacy.14
In light of the constitutional problems posed by quarantining AIDS
carriers and the questionable effectiveness of such measures, laws pro-
posed in the United States that are similar to England's may prove un-
constitutional and impractical in the United States. This Note will
1981); CALIFORNIA STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH SERVICES, CONTROL OF COMUNICABLE DIS-
EASES IN CALIFORNIA 39-40 (1983). Because most discussion in the media and government
refers to both types of restrictions as "quarantine," this Note will use "quarantine" to refer to
both isolation and quarantine of humans.
5. See, e.g., Adler, The AIDS Conflict, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 23, 1985, at 24; Pagano, Quar-
antine Considered for AIDS Victims, 4 CAL. LAW. 17 (Mar. 1984); Nichols, AIDS-A New
Reason to Regulate Homosexuality?, 11 J. CONTEMP. L. 315, 316, 340-43 (1984); Novick,
Quarantine and AIDS, 49 CONN. MED. 81 (1985); Texas to Request AIDS Quarantine, San
Francisco Chron., Oct. 23, 1985, at 19, col. 5; Higham, Proposed Illinois Law Would Quaran-
tine AIDS Victims, The Advocate, Dec. 10, 1985, at 25, col. 2.
6. See infra note 90.
7. Adler, supra note 5, at 18, 23; Alter, Sins of Omission, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 23, 1985, at
25; Texas to Request AIDS Quarantine, supra note 5, at 19, col. 5.
8. South Florida Blood Service v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 800, 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
9. See infra notes 71, 81-90 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 46-64 and accompanying text.
11. Public Health Act, 1984, ch. 22 §§ 35, 37, 38; see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
12. See supra note 2.
13. See infra notes 293-299, 309-311 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 273-330 and accompanying text.
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examine the use of public health laws to quarantine AIDS carriers in
England and the United States.15 The discussion will first survey the
history of quarantine of humans. Second, an overview of the AIDS epi-
demic will be given and the disease will be compared with other conta-
gious and quarantinable diseases. Third, the Note will analyze the
government's authority to regulate public health in England and the
United States. Fourth, England's AIDS quarantine law and United
States laws and proposals that may be used to quarantine AIDS carriers
will be examined. The constitutional and practical problems posed in the
United States by the legislation and proposals will be discussed. Finally,
ways to prevent inappropriate use of quarantine and more effective alter-
natives to quarantine will be recommended.
H. HISTORY OF QUARANTINE
The history of quarantine indicates that it was often used to alleviate
fears of disease and was based upon inaccurate assumptions about meth-
ods of disease transmission. Therefore, quarantine often bore little rela-
tionship to preventing the spread of disease and usually sacrificed
concern for the afflicted individual in the interest of safeguarding public
health.
A. Quarantine in Europe Before 1900
The Old Testament documents perhaps the earliest use of quaran-
tine in its description of the detailed procedures used for quarantine of
lepers.16 The procedures included diagnosis, isolation, and treatment to
the extent available, and were a controlling influence on public health
regulations throughout history.17 When the leprosy epidemic spread pe-
riodically in Europe between the second and fifteenth centuries, provi-
sions for its control always included versions of biblical quarantine
15. AIDS presents many related legal issues that are beyond the scope of this Note, in-
cluding mandatory blood testing, quarantine of places where individuals may engage in high-
risk sexual activity, exclusion of children with AIDS from schools, employment discrimination
against AIDS carriers, segregation of prisoners with AIDS, and government registration of
persons exposed to the disease. See Note, Constitutional Rights of AIDS Carriers, 99 HARv. L.
REV. 1274 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Rights of AIDS Carriers] for a thorough analysis of
constitutional limitations on AIDS regulations. For a discussion of the relationship between
the criminalization of homosexuality and efforts to control AIDS through public health regu-
lations, see Nichols, supra note 5.
16. Leviticus 14; see generally, Edelman, International Travel and Our National Quaran-
tine System, 37 TEMP. L.Q. 28-29 (1963). Lepers suffer from leprosy, a chronic, communicable
disease caused by bacterial infection. Today, mild forms of leprosy can be treated successfully
with antibiotic therapy. 2 J. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE, L-46 (1986).
17. C. WINSLOW, THE CONQUEST OF EPIDEMIC DISEASE 89 (1980).
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procedures. 8 Special commissions decided whether an individual suf-
fered from leprosy, and those who did were ostracized from society as if
they had already died.19
The next epidemic of historical significance was the bubonic plague,
known as the "Black Death,"20 which in the mid-fourteenth century
killed between one-quarter and three-quarters of the population of Eu-
rope.21 Because of the high degree of suffering and devastation, the
plague was perceived as divine punishment for sin, and people tried to
find a scapegoat. Because they were suspected of poisoning the drinking
water, Jews were persecuted.22 Some were herded into wooden structures
and burned alive;23 whole communities of Jews were slaughtered, their
bodies loaded into wine casks and floated down the Rhine River.24
Nobles and cripples were also suspect.25
Quarantine measures were instituted because doing something about
the disease was psychologically preferable to apathetic despair.26 Venice
had regulations for isolation of infected travelers and quarantine of ships
as early as 1348.27 In 1485 the city adopted regulations requiring all
vessels coming from ports where the plague had spread to stay in the
harbor for forty days. 28 The forty-day period was based on the length of
the Lenten season, which seemed to be as good a reason as any for deter-
mining the length of quarantine.29 The regulations were ineffective, how-
ever, because they failed to account for the role of rats and fleas in the
18. Id. at 89-90.
19. Id. at 90-91.
20. Bubonic plague was called the "Black Death" because it is an infection of the blood
that often turns hemorrhages black. Roark, Familar Pattern: AIDS Adds to History of
Epidemics, L.A. Times, Feb. 23, 1986, at 20, col. 1.
21. C. WINSLOW, supra note 17, at 96-97.
22. Id. at 98; Roark, supra note 20, at 21, col. 2.
23. F. CARTWRIGHT, DISEASE AND HISTORY 46 (1972).
24. Roark, supra note 20, at 21, col. 3.
25. F. CARTWRIGHT, supra note 23, at 46. This sort of scapegoating was not limited to
the bubonic plague. One commentator has noted, "One of the myths about epidemics... is
that there is somebody to blame-somebody is responsible." Roark, supra note 20, at 21, col.
I. For example, the Italians considered syphilis the French disease, while the French called it
the Italian disease. In the nineteenth century, influenza was known as the Spanish disease, and
through the twentieth century it has been labeled the Hong Kong flu or the Asian flu. "In one
sense, the sort of scapegoating that goes on is a way to cut down on anxiety... a way to
believe that somebody else is responsible-that someone else, not us, will get it." Id. (quoting
Charles R. Rosenberg, historian of Medicine at the University of Pennsylvania).
26. W. MCNEILL, PLAGUES AND PEOPLES 170 (1976).
27. C. WINSLOW, supra note 17, at 115-16.
28. Edelman, supra note 16. Forty days is quaranti giorni in Italian; the English word
"quarantine" derived from that phrase. F. CARTWRIGHT, supra note 23, at 50.
29. Edelman, supra note 16, at 29.
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spread of the plague.30 Healthy people feared quarantine more than con-
tracting the illness because of the hardships imposed by long-term isola-
tion from society.31 Because people obtained some degree of
psychological solace from quarantine measures, theories of how diseases
spread were advanced to justify continued quarantine.32 In addition,
where well-defined health regulations were not instituted, nothing pla-
cated society's fears of the epidemic. The absence of quarantine meas-
ures thus gave rise to violent expressions of popular hates and fears
provoked by the unknown nature of the disease. 3
From 1664-1665, a second outbreak of bubonic plague caused the
Great London Plague, which killed one-sixth of London's population.34
Health authorities exterminated thousands of dogs and cats thought to
be carriers, ironically increasing the rat population which was primarily
responsible for the spread of the disease.35 The widespread death led
England to institute quarantine measures 36 that formed the basis of rigor-
ous quarantine laws passed in 1710. 31 People afflicted with the disease
were shut up in closed houses with red crosses on the door.38 No one but
"inhumane nurses" were allowed to go in or out until a month after all
the members of the house were either dead or recovered. 39 The proce-
dures were cruel and ineffective, which prompted England's chief medi-
cal practitioner to propose a health council comprised of politicians,
magistrates, and physicians to ensure impartial justice in administration
of quarantine laws so that unnecessary hardships were not imposed on
those quarantined.'
By the end of the eighteenth century, plague was still considered
communicable between persons, and elaborate quarantine measures, in-
volving many cumbersome and unnecessary procedures, remained in ef-
fect.41 These procedures inadvertently were of some value in controlling
the unknown factor of flea-borne infection.42
30. W. MCNEILL, supra note 26, at 170-71.
31. C. WINSLOW, supra note 17, at 116.
32. W. McNEILL, supra note 26, at 238.
33. Id. at 172.
34. Edelman, supra note 16, at 29.
35. Leerhsen, Epidemics: A Paralyzing Effect, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 23, 1985, at 23.
36. Petteway, Compulsory Quarantine and Treatment of Persons Infected with Venereal
Diseases, 18 FLA. L.J. 13 (1944).
37. Quarantine Act, 1710, 9 Ann. ch. 2; see Edelman, supra note 16, at 29.
38. C. WINSLOW, supra note 17, at 190.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 190-91.
41. Id. at 238.
42. For example, provisions requiring that officials stay a cane's length away from persons
1986]
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During the nineteenth century, cholera epidemics in Asia and Eu-
rope led to detailed quarantine regulations.43 Health authorities did not
know that the disease was caused by unsanitary water and sewage sys-
tems, so the regulations failed to account for transmission by water and
food.' The quarantines were therefore largely ineffective, which brought
criticism from Swiss physicians appointed to investigate procedures used
in Turkey and Russia:
[W]hen cholera first appeared in this country the general belief was
that the disease spreads principally, if not entirely, by communication
of the infected with the healthy, and that therefore the main security of
nations, cities, and individuals consists in the isolation of the infected
from the uninfected-a doctrine which naturally led to the enforce-
ment of rigorous quarantine regulations; ... [to] the excitement of
panic; and the neglect, and often the abandonment of the sick even by
relations and friends .... [T]he practical application of that doctrine
did no good, but was fraught with much evil.4
B. Quarantine in the United States Before 1900
Quarantine in the American colonies was primarily a local concern
regulated by local laws.4 6 Most of these pre-1900 laws were enacted in
response to one of the two major epidemics. First, the high incidence of
smallpox between 1647 and 1751 led to a series of laws aimed at isolating
the sick.47 These regulations provided for smallpox victims to be isolated
inside homes or sent to quarantine hospitals, also known as "pest-
houses."4 Massachusetts was most effective in controlling the spread of
smallpox because it had the greatest number of health regulations
preventing direct human contact, which was how smallpox was
transmitted.49
Second, a yellow fever epidemic appeared in Philadelphia in 1699,
which led to a maritime quarantine 0 in 1700." 1 Since yellow fever was
not casually contagious, but spread primarily by mosquitoes, use of quar-
suspected of being infected, and that cloths and furs be aired, waved, and shaken probably
prevented some flea infestation. Id. at 238.
43. Id. at 253-55.
44. Id. at 254; Roark, supra note 20, at 21, col. 1.
45. C. WINSLOW, supra note 17, at 253-54.
46. Edelman, supra note 16, at 29; Morgenstern, The Role of the Federal Government in
Protecting Citizens from Communicable Diseases, 47 U. CIN. L. REV. 537, 541 (1978); J.
DUFFY, EPIDEMICS IN COLONIAL AMERICA 101-03 (1971).
47. J. DUFFY, supra note 46.
48. Id. at 103.
49. Id.
50. A maritime quarantine forbids ships suspected of carrying serious contagious diseases
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antine measures failed to control the epidemic and instead resulted in
more harm than good. Two medical commentators in 1805 noted this
effect:
[Quarantine procedures] have led to the waste of millions of dollars
and to the sacrifice of thousands of lives from that faith in their effi-
cacy, which has led to the neglect of domestic cleanliness. Further-
more, a belief in the contagious nature of the yellow fever, which is so
solemnly enforced by the execution of quarantine laws, has demoral-
ized our citizens. It has, in many instances, extinguished friendship,
annihilated religion, and violated the sacraments of nature, by resisting
even the loud and vehement cries of filial and parental blood.52
C. Quarantine in the 1900s
Scientific advances in the twentieth century, including increased
knowledge about the transmission of disease, have increased the effective-
ness of quarantine measures and limited their application to the control
of disease transmitted through direct, usually casual, human contact.
Arbitrary and counterproductive quarantine regulations, however, have
not been wholly eliminated. For example, nine cases of bubonic plague
appeared in San Francisco in 1900, and the city responded by quarantin-
ing a district that was populated primarily by Asians.53 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit invalidated the measure
because it was discriminatory, unreasonable, unjust, and oppressive.
54
Quarantine measures were more successfully instituted to prevent
the spread of typhoid fever. Knowledge about typhoid fever led to the
recognition that healthy carriers as well as the physically ill could trans-
mit disease.5 Typhoid carriers have been quarantined since early in the
century. One such carrier was Typhoid Mary, the "reluctant patient."56
Although she never actually contracted typhoid, Mary Mallon was re-
sponsible for infecting fifty-three people by continuing to work as a cook,
from having any contact with shore. WEBSrER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIoNARY
1859 (1976).
51. Edelman, supra note 16, at 29-30.
52. C. WINSLOW, supra note 17, at 205 (quoting B. RUSH, MEDICAL INQUIRIES (1805)).
53. Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10 (9th Cir. 1900); see Nichols, supra note 5, at 336; see
also infra note 176 and accompanying text.
54. Jew Ho, 103 F. at 13.
55. C. WINSLOW, supra note 17, at 344.
56. M. Mills & J. Mills, Typhoid Mary Revisited: Legal Responsibility for Reporting and
Quarantine of Patients with Infectious Diseases 6-7 (available from John Mills, M.D., Medical
Service, Rm. 5H4, San Francisco General Hospital Medical Center, 1001 Portrero Ave., San
Francisco, CA 94110) [hereinafter Mills].
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contrary to health department restrictions, thereby spreading typhoid to
customers through contaminated food.57 Authorities finally succeeded in
quarantining her permanently from 1915 until her death in 1938. The
Illinois Supreme Court approved as constitutional the quarantine of an-
other typhoid carrier in 1922 when it ordered quarantine of a boarding
house manager who continued to infect her guests through indirect expo-
sure to her contaminated urine and feces.
58
Quarantine regulations were also used for polio, which killed 57,000
Americans between 1915 and 1955.19 Not all the regulations were appro-
priate or effective, however. For example, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, quar-
antined children in their own backyards during the summer of 1944 on
the theory that polio was more virulent in the summer months.' Actu-
ally, polio could be spread at any time of the year by contact with an
infected individual because the virus enters the body through the mouth.
Quarantine is not limited to America's past. Victims of venereal dis-
ease have also been quarantined throughout this century and continue to
be subject to "hold and treat" provisions.6 This type of quarantine is
used largely as a convenient police tool for controlling prostitution.62
Today, however, tuberculosis patients are those most often quaran-
tined.6" Courts have upheld quarantine of tuberculosis victims and carri-
ers who refuse treatment when a sufficient threat to public health is
shown and proper procedures are followed. 4
Thus, throughout history, authorities have responded to epidemic
disease and death with extensive quarantine laws. The measures, how-
ever, often failed effectively to prevent the spread of disease for two rea-
sons. First, the quarantine laws were based upon false assumptions
about the spread of disease. Second, health officials failed to adapt the
quarantine procedures to the varying modes of disease transmission. Ul-
57. Id. at 7.
58. People ex rel. Barmore v. Robertson, 302 Ill. 422, 134 N.E. 815 (1922).
59. Leerhsen, supra note 35.
60. Roark, supra note 20, at 21, col. 1. Other towns feared polio was spread by insects
and sprayed substantial quantities of the toxic pesticide DDT. Id. at 20, col. 3.
61. Hold and treat provisions allow authorities to detain persons arrested for prostitution
while they are tested, and if necessary, treated for venereal disease. Mills, supra note 56, at 9.
62. Id.; see, e.g., Petteway, supra note 36; Reynolds v. McNichols, 488 F.2d 1378 (10th
Cir. 1973); In re Martin, 83 Cal. App. 2d 164, 188 P.2d 287 (3d Dist. 1948); In re Shepard, 51
Cal. App. 49, 195 P. 1077, 1077 (2d Dist. 1921); DENVER REV. MUNI. CODE § 24-131.
63. See Mills, supra note 56, at 9.
64. E.g., In re Halko, 246 Cal. App. 2d 553, 54 Cal. Rptr. 661 (2d Dist. 1966); State v.
Snow, 230 Ark. 746, 324 S.W.2d 532 (1959); cf. Balderas v. Pitchess, Civ. No. 000617 (Super.
Ct. L.A. Cal. 1980), discussed infra text accompanying notes 205-210.
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timately, the fear of disease led to persecution and social ostracism of
those infected, usually without decreasing the risk of illness and death.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF AIDS
Since AIDS was recognized in 1981,65 knowledge about the disease
has continually changed as research progresses.66 The United States
Centers for Disease Control (CDC)67 have reported that AIDS is a sexu-
ally transmissible infection caused by a virus known as HIV.61 It can
result in an improperly functioning immune system that leaves victims
vulnerable to opportunistic infections.69 It is estimated that at least
twenty-five to fifty percent of those infected with the virus will ultimately
develop AIDS, and a larger percentage may develop conditions related to
AIDS.70 Reported AIDS cases have resulted from exposure to the virus
up to seven years before diagnosis of the disease; longer incubation peri-
ods may be possible.71
At present there is no established treatment for AIDS or vaccine to
prevent AIDS.72 A commercially available blood test has been devel-
oped to determine the presence of antibodies to HIV. Presence of an-
tibodies does not necessarily indicate that the active virus is in the blood,
that the patient is presently infectious, or that he or she will develop
AIDS. A positive antibody test determines only exposure to the virus.73
65. Friedland, Saltzman, Rogers, Kahl, Lesser, Marguerite, Mayers, & Klein, Lack of
Transmission of HTLV-Ill/LAV Infection to Household Contacts of Patients with AIDS or
AIDS-Related Complex with Oral Candidiasis, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 344 (1986) [hereinafter
Friedland].
66. Sande, Transmission of AIDS, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 380 (1986).
67. The Centers for Disease Control are an arm of the United States Department of
Health and Human Services.
68. HIV stands for human immunodeficiency virus and is the currently preferred term for
the AIDS-causing agent. Church, Call to Battle, TIME, Nov. 10, 1986, at 18. The AIDS virus
was previously referred to as HTLV-III/LAV, which stands for human T-cell lymphotropic
virus type III/lymphadenopathy-associated virus. Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
(AIDS), 34 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 75S (1985) [hereinafter AIDS].
The weekly report is published by the CDC.
69. Infection by an opportunistic disease is the principal criterion for diagnosing a patient
with AIDS. These infections include pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (63% of patients diag-
nosed); Kaposi's sarcoma, a form of skin cancer (24%); and candida esophagitis, a fungal
infection of the mouth and throat (7%). Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-
United States, 35 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 17-18 (1986) [hereinafter Up-
date-United States].
70. Church, supra note 68, at 18.
71. Update-United States, supra note 69, at 20.
72. AIDS, supra note 68, at 75S.
73. Id. at 76S. HIV can be isolated from body fluids and tissues through a complex and
expensive procedure involving laboratory growth of virus cultures over a period of six weeks.
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As of November 1986, the CDC had been notified of over 27,000
people with AIDS in the United States, and over half of them had died.74
Approximately 1.5 million Americans are estimated to be carrying the
AIDS virus.7" Over ninety percent of adults with AIDS can be placed in
groups that are considered "high-risk"; these groups are at greatest risk
of contracting AIDS.76 These groups include homosexual or bisexual
men, intravenous drug abusers, hemophiliacs, heterosexual sex partners
of persons with AIDS or at risk for AIDS, and recipients of blood trans-
fusions.77 As of November 1986, there were 520 reported cases of AIDS
in England, and approximately 250 of those reported having the disease
were dead.78 Groups at high risk of contracting the disease in England
are the same as in the United States.79
Most of the public concern and debate over measures to control the
spread of AIDS have centered around how the disease is transmitted.
Writing for the New England Journal of Medicine, Dr. Merle A. Sande
notes:
Although our understanding of the disease has been progressing rap-
idly, the new knowledge has often produced more public concern than
relief. The identification of the etiologic agent as a virus- although of
critical scientific importance-did little to quell the fears of either the
At present, such procedures are limited to AIDS research and are not used for diagnosing or
determining the infectiousness of AIDS carriers. Because there is no practical way to deter-
mine whether active HIV is present, antibody-positive persons are presumed infectious for
purposes of screening blood donations and determining safe sexual practices. Telephone inter-
view with Donald Abrams, M.D., Assistant Director, AIDS Clinic, San Francisco General
Hospital (Apr. 15, 1987).
74. Morganthau, AIDS Grim Prospects, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 10, 1986, at 20 [hereinafter
Grim Prospects].
75. Id.
76. Update-United States, supra note 69, at 18.
77. In the United States, a total of 65% of AIDS patients are homosexual or bisexual men
who are not known intravenous (IV) drug users, 8% are homosexual or bisexual men who
have histories of IV drug use, 17% are heterosexual IV drug users, 1% are persons with hemo-
philia, 1% are heterosexual sex partners of persons with AIDS or at risk for AIDS, and 2%
are recipients of transfused blood or blood components. The remaining six percent have not
been classified by recognized risk factors for AIDS. Id. Of the 231 children under age 13 who
have AIDS, 75% came from families in which one or both parents had AIDS or were at
increased risk for developing AIDS, 14% had received transfusions of blood or blood compo-
nents before onset of illness, and 5% had hemophilia. Id. at 19.
78. Britain Joins the War Against AIDS, L.A. Times, Nov. 9, 1986, at 22, col 3. The rate
of AIDS cases in Britain is about four per million population, as compared with 60 per million
in the United States. Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-Europe, 35 MORBID-
ITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 35-36 (1986) [hereinafter Update-Europe].
79. Of 1330 patients in 21 European countries, 78% were homosexual or bisexual men,
7% were IV drug users, 2% were homosexual and IV drug users, 4% were hemophiliacs, and
2% were recipients of blood transfusions. Update-Europe, supra, note 78, at 36-37.
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medical community or the general population. Instead, people reacted
to the fact that AIDS is caused by a virus with a hysteria reminiscent
of another viral infection-the polio epidemic of the early 1950's....
Probably the most sensational information, and perhaps the most mis-
leading, was that the virus had been isolated from saliva and tears.
This suggested to the public that the disease might be spread by food
handlers, by kissing or shaking hands, or even by contact with fomites.
The media did little to dispel these notions; on the contrary, the public
was led to believe that AIDS was a highly contagious disease.80
Studies, however, have consistently shown that casual contact with
AIDS patients in the home, at work, and at school, and even intensive
exposure to contaminated secretions among health care workers, pose
virtually no risk of infection."s Rather, the routes of transmission are by
intimate, "unsafe" sexual contact,82 both homosexual and heterosexual,83
80. Sande, supra note 66, at 380.
81. A study published in February 1986 of 101 household contacts of 39 AIDS patients
found evidence of infection in only one contact, a five-year-old child who most likely acquired
the infection before birth from her mother. Both her parents were IV drug users, and her
mother was diagnosed with AIDS in 1984. Except sexual partners and children born to in-
fected mothers, none of the family members in more than 12,000 cases reported to the CDC
were known to have contracted AIDS. The study concludes that despite prolonged and close
contact with patients with AIDS, household contacts who are not sexual partners of, or born
to, patients with AIDS are at minimal or no risk of infection with HIV. Types of contact
among members of the study included baths, showers, dishes, and toilets, in addition to hug-
ging and kissing. Friedland, supra note 65, at 344, 346-47.
The CDC concluded in November 1985 that "[b]ecause AIDS is not transmitted through
preparation or serving of food and beverages,. . . food-service workers known to be infected
with AIDS should not be restricted from work unless they have another infection or illness for
which such restriction would be warranted." Summary: Recommendations for Preventing
Transmission of Infection with HTL V-III/LAV in the Workplace, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTAL-
rrY WEEKLY REP. 681 (1985) [hereinafter AIDS in the Workplace]. Of 1750 health care work-
ers with frequent exposure to the body fluids of AIDS patients, less than 0.1% of workers not
otherwise members of high-risk groups were found to have been exposed to the virus. In
addition, there is less than a 0.5% chance that the disease can be contracted by an accidental
needle stick with a needle contaminated with blood from an AIDS patient. Sande, supra note
66, at 381.
The World Health Organization (WHO) concluded in late 1985 that "[t]here is no evi-
dence that LAV/HTLV-III is spread through casual contact with an infected individual, such
as contact in family settings, schools, or other groups living or working together. The risk of
infection of health-care workers seems very remote. At present, there is no evidence that
blood-sucking insects transmit the disease." Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: Meeting
of the WHO Collaborating Centres on AIDS, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP.
678 (1985) [hereinafter Meeting of WHO].
82. The AIDS virus can be spread through vaginal or anal intercourse by entering a per-
son's bloodstream through tiny, invisible tears in the surface lining of the vagina or rectum.
The virus may possibly be spread by oral sex, but there is no evidence to confirm this possibil-
ity. U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, DEP'T OF HEALTH, SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON
AIDS 16, 25 (1986) [hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT]. Because AIDS may be
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by injection of contaminated blood, and by intrauterine spread of the
virus from mother to fetus.84
These conclusions were reiterated in October 1986, by the United
States Surgeon General, who issued the government's first major state-
ment on what the nation should do to stop the spread of AIDS.85 The
report stresses that AIDS is not spread by common, everyday contact
such as shaking hands, hugging, social kissing, crying, coughing, or
sneezing. The disease has not been contracted from toilet seats, dining in
restaurants (even when an employee there is infected), hot tubs, swim-
ming pools, or shared linens.8 6 AIDS "is contagious in the same way
that sexually transmitted diseases, such as syphilis and gonorrhea, are
contagious," the report states.87 Working independently of the Surgeon
General, a committee assembled by the Institute of Medicine of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences 8 endorsed his statements that AIDS is not
spread by casual contact.89 The findings of the Surgeon General and Na-
tional Academy of Sciences are consistent with those of other research-
ers, who have been characterized as "unanimous and vehement" on the
point that one cannot contract AIDS by casual contact.90
Nevertheless, AIDS remains a serious health crisis. The National
spread during these sexual practices, such practices are referred to as "unsafe sex." Using
condoms during sexual intercourse and mutual masturbation are considered to be among the
safe forms of sex. Id. at 17-18.
83. In the United States, there were 1100 persons who acquired AIDS by heterosexual
contact as of November 1986. The Public Health Service has projected this number will in-
crease to almost 7000 in 1991. Church, supra note 68, at 18-19. The number of heterosexual
cases after 1991 may increase dramatically, however, since nothing suggests heterosexuals are
less susceptible to the disease than other groups. In Central Africa, the AIDS virus is most
frequently transmitted by heterosexual intercourse. Id. at 19.
84. Sande, supra note 66, at 380-82; Friedland, supra note 65, at 344; AIDS in the Work-
place, supra note 81, at 682.
85. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 82.
86. Id. at 21.
87. Id.
88. The National Academy of Sciences was chartered by Congress in 1863 as a private
body to give advice to the federal government. Church, supra note 68. It has been called "the
most prestigious body of scientists in the nation." Grim Prospects, supra note 74, at 20.
89. Church, supra note 68.
90. Id. Some argue that, because research on AIDS did not begin until 1981 and the virus
may have an incubation period of up to seven years, it is too soon to know with certainty how
AIDS spreads. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, Arguments in Favor of the Cali-
fornia AIDS initative in CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION BALLOT PAMPHLET, Nov. 4, 1986,
at 51 [hereinafter CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET]; A Handy Guide to the State Ballot Pro-
positions, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 29, 1986, at A4, col. 4. Considering, however, that not
one case acquired by casual contact has been reported, see supra note 81, and the unanimity
among the medical and scientific research communities, it would be difficult to conclude there
is a danger of casual transmission.
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Academy of Sciences predicts "catastrophe" unless its spread is
checked.9" Projections of the United States Public Health Service indi-
cate that by the end of the year 1991, 270,000 people in the United States
will have developed AIDS, and 179,000 of them will have died.92 Be-
tween five and ten million persons will have been infected.93
With the exception of venereal diseases, AIDS is unlike diseases for
which quarantine has been required. AIDS is spread only through sex-
ual contact or blood, or from mother to fetus, not casually or through
indirect means such as insect carriers and contaminated water or food.94
AIDS is quite similar in routes of transmission to hepatitis B, which is
often fatal. Both viruses are spread through sexual contact, exposure to
contaminated blood, and transmission from infected mothers to off-
spring.95 The risk for hepatitis B infection in households and health-care
settings far exceeds that for HIV infection, however. 96 And yet, patients
with hepatitis B have not been quarantined, and routine screening of pa-
tients or health care workers for evidence of hepatitis B infection has
never been recommended. 97 Rather, control of transmission has empha-
sized appropriate handling of body fluids and items soiled with body
fluids.98
At present, the most effective way to prevent transmission of the
AIDS virus is to avoid behavior that could result in exposure to the vi-
rus.99 Thus, the World Health Organization, the CDC, the United States
Surgeon General, the National Academy of Sciences, and independent
researchers have stated that the most important factors in controlling the
disease are conducting further research, and decreasing unsafe sexual
practices and intravenous drug abuse through education programs and
public information. 1" Studies from New York and San Francisco, cities
with a high incidence of the disease, suggest that such programs have
prompted many gay men to change their sexual practices over a rela-
tively short period of time, and rates of venereal disease among this
91. Grim Prospects, supra note 74, at 20.
92. Church, supra note 68.
93. Grim Prospects, supra note 74, at 20.
94. See supra notes 16-64 and accompanying text.
95. Friedland, supra note 65, at 348.
96. AIDS in the Workplace, supra note 81, at 682-83; Friedland, supra note 65, at 348.
97. AIDS in the Workplace, supra note 81, at 683.
98. Id.
99. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 82, at 14.
100. Church, supra note 68; Meeting of WHO, supra note 81, at 679; AIDS, supra note 68,
at 75S; Sande, supra note 66, at 382; Grim Prospects, supra note 74, at 21; SURGEON GEN-
ERAL'S REPORT, supra note 82, at 14; Morganthau, Future Shock, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 24,
1986, at 30, 34-39 [hereinafter Future Shock].
1986]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
group have decreased over fifty percent.10 Similar results have been re-
ported from London, where safe sexual practices among a group of gay
and bisexual men have drastically reduced their rates of gonorrhea and
HIV infection.102
IV. GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY TO REGULATE
PUBLIC HEALTH
The governments of both England and the United States clearly pos-
sess broad authority to regulate public health and control epidemic dis-
eases such as AIDS. One commentator notes:
The protection and promotion of the public health has long been rec-
ognized as the responsibility of the sovereign power. Government is,
in fact, organized for the express purpose, among others, of conserving
the public health and cannot divest itself of this important duty. This
principle was well established in early English law and came with the
colonists to America. 1
0 3
Tracing the source of this power, however, proves more intricate for the
United States than for England because of the complexities posed by the
United States constitutional and federal system.
A. England
1. Government Authority
When it held extensive sovereign power, the British monarchy used
that power to control administration of public health. In 1636 Charles I
ordered the collection of documents for the information of magistrates in
a continuation of quarantine practice to control the plague."° Queen
Elizabeth proclaimed that anyone suffering from smallpox who ap-
proached the royal palaces would be guilty of treason. 1o5 Administration
and execution of the health orders was, however, typically left to local
authorities. 106
101. In August 1984, 69% of San Francisco gay and bisexual men surveyed reported no
unsafe sexual activity; this percentage increased to 81% in April 1985. Self-Reported Behav-
ioral Change Among Gay and Bisexual Men--San Francisco, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 613-14 (1985); Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome in the San Fran-
cisco Cohort Study, 1978-1985, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 574 (1985).
102. The rise in HIV infection among the London subjects averaged 7.4% per year from
1982 to 1984. Between 1984 and 1986, this rate fell to 1.8%. The gonorrhea rate fell from
15.3% per year to 5.1%. San Francisco Sentinel, Apr. 10, 1987, at 10, col. 4.
103. Tobey, Public Health and the Police Power, 4 N.Y.U. L. REV. 126 (1927).
104. C. WINSLOW, supra note 17, at 122.
105. Liberty and Disease, 92 JusT. P. 202 (1928).
106. C. WINSLOW, supra note 17, at 122-23.
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As the power shifted from the sovereign to Parliament, Parliament
gradually assumed more responsibility to legislate for public health, and
now has the ultimate authority to make health laws in Britain."°7 The
Quarantine Act of 1710 was a comprehensive set of regulations to be
applied across the nation, 108 and the Public Health Acts of 1936 and
1968 included detailed quarantine procedures. 10 9
Today, British health law is codified in the Public Health Act of
1984. Under this Act, a judge may order anyone suffering from a "notifi-
able disease" to submit to a medical exam and to be taken to a hospital
and detained there.' Notifiable diseases are those that must be reported
to the proper local authority. These diseases include cholera, plague, re-
lapsing fever, smallpox, and typhus.1 The medical practititioner who
diagnoses the disease must report the patient's name and address. Local
authorities have the power to apply the Act to diseases other than those
enumerated as notifiable diseases.112 The Act provides that a patient can
be removed to a hospital if a judge is satisfied that:
[A] person is suffering from a notifiable disease and-
(a) that his circumstances are such that proper precautions to prevent
the spread of infection cannot be taken, or that such precautions are
not being taken, and
(b) that serious risk of infection is thereby caused to other persons,
and
(e) that accommodation for him is available in a suitable hospital
vested in the Secretary of State .... 113
The judge may order the patient detained in the hospital if the judge is
satisfied that "proper precautions to prevent the spread of disease would
not be taken by that person outside the hospital." ' 4 Persons who know-
ingly expose others to a notifiable disease by presence or conduct are
fined.' 5
107. Public Health Act, 1984, ch. 1, §§ 1, 8, 23.
108. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
109. Public Health Act, 1936, ch. 49, §§ 143-172; Public Health Act, 1968, ch. 46, §§ 47-
57.
110. Public Health Act, 1984, ch. 22, §§ 35, 37, 38.
111. Id. §§ 10, 11.
112. Id. § 16.
113. Id. § 37.
114. Id. § 37, as modified by the regulations enacted in 1985 to prevent the spread of
AIDS. See infra notes 229-232 and accompanying text. The prior section provided that the
judge could order detention if the judge is satisfied that the patient "would not on leaving the
hospital be provided with lodging or accommodations in which proper precautions could be
taken to prevent the spread of the disease by him .... " Public Health Act, 1984, ch. 22, § 38.
115. Id. § 17.
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2. Impact of Personal Liberty and the European Convention
While judges can use discretion in administering public health laws,
Great Britain has no judicial review of legislation;116 its legal system is
based on the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy. Parliamentary
supremacy means that no written constitution restricts the English Par-
liament's authority to adopt any law it wishes to enact, and that no Eng-
lish court reviews Parliamentary enactments.1 7 England does have a
constitutional law tradition embodied in documents such as the Magna
Carta of 1215, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, the Bill of Rights of 1689,
and the Act of Settlement of 1700. But Parliament can amend or repeal
any of these documents, and courts must apply the current law of Parlia-
ment even when in conflict with a previous law. 18
Parliament's ultimate law-making authority is tempered somewhat,
however, by considerations of personal liberty and the European Con-
vention on Human Rights." 9 The European Convention on Human
Rights 2° is an international agreement among twenty-one Western Eu-
ropean nations that is designed to preserve the basic rights of citizens of
the member nations. 121 The United Kingdom is a signatory and accepts
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. A claimant who
loses in a United Kingdom court can petition the European Court for a
hearing. If the Court agrees to hear the case, it issues a declaratory judg-
ment; if the judgment is adverse to that of the British court, the United
Kingdom is bound by the judgment.' 22 This process was illustrated in a
case involving the recommitment of an individual to a hospital for the
criminally insane.1 23 The mental health administrator's decision to re-
commit the claimant was not reviewable on its merits by the English
116. Abernathy, Should the United Kingdom Adopt a Bill of Rights?, 31 AM. J. CoMP. L.
431 (1983).
117. Id.
118. Id. This situation has led to proposals for a British Bill of Rights, with provisions for
procedures similar to United States judicial review of legislation to ensure compliance with the
Bill of Rights. See L. SCARMAN, ENGLISH LAW-NEW DIMENSIONS (1974); M. ZANDER, A
BILL OF RIGHTS? 5-18 (3d ed. 1985). The absence of any reported English cases involving
judicial review of quarantine of interested persons demonstrates Parliament's ultimate author-
ity in drafting such health regulations and the latitiude for administrative discretion in apply-
ing them.
119. Abernathy, supra note 116, at 441-42.
120. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
121. Id. at 441.
122. Id. at 442.




court.1 24 The court could determine only whether the administrator had
abused his discretion by acting in bad faith or capriciously; it could not
examine the reasons for the detention. The European Court of Human
Rights required that appropriate procedures be instituted to ensure that
the patient's mental defect persisted and detention was necessary in the
public interest.'25 Britain complied with the European Court's
judgment.
26
In addition to the European Court's requirement that detention of
the mentally ill be necessary in the public interest, British statutes some-
times require sufficient public interest to justify orders of public health
officials and courts that restrict personal liberties in an effort to safeguard
public health.' 27 A finding of such public interest is not always sufficient
to support a law. For example, Victorian "anti-vaccinationists" de-
feated compulsory vaccination laws in 1907 despite the public interest in
preventing disease, partly because of the belief of the Victorian people in
maintaining individual freedom at all costs.' 28 But in 1928 a patient who
refused to be examined for smallpox was imprisoned.' 29 A commentator
noted at the time that "even in these more enlightened and lenient days it
is not unreasonable to make it a punishable offense that a man should
show recklessness in carrying a disease or contumacy in refusing to un-
dergo reasonable and necessary examination."
' 130
Today, the Public Health Act of 1984 allows a judge to order medi-
cal exams if "in the public interest."' 31 Cases concerning economic regu-
lations have held that an act done in the public interest must involve a
direct benefit to the public, and is to be decided in light of all the circum-
stances as they presently exist.' 32 In addition, some cases have balanced
the public interest against the right of privacy recognized in recent Brit-
ish common law. This right of privacy is invoked not to wholly abrogate
statutes, but to construe them and to govern court proceedings.' 33 In
124. X v. United Kingdom, 46 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A.) (1981).
125. Id.
126. Abernathy, supra note 116, at 442. The European Court arguably would require simi-
lar procedural safeguards for detention of the physically ill.
127. E.g., Public Health Act, 1984, ch. 22, § 35, 36.
128. MacLeod, Law, Medicine, and Public Opinion: The Resistance to Compulsory Health
Legislation, 1870-1907, 1967 PuB. L. 189, 210, 211.
129. Liberty and Disease, supra note 105.
130. Id.
131. Public Health Act, 1984, ch. 22, §§ 35, 36.
132. Consett Iron v. Clavering Trustees, 2 K.B. 42, 52-55, (C.A.) (1935); Cartwright v.
Post Office, 2 All E.R. 646, 651 (1968), aff'd, 1 All E.R. 421, (C.A.) (1969).
133. Seipp, English Judicial Recognition of a Right to Privacy, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
325, 366 (1983).
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developing this area of the common law, English courts have indirectly
drawn on the written constitutions of Commonwealth members, the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights, and the American cases that de-
lineate a right of privacy.134 Recent English cases have required a strong
showing of necessity to justify invasion of privacy by medical exams and
blood tests, and have balanced the interests of the individual and the
public.135 For example, the strong public interest in the administration
of justice required a plaintiff in a personal injury case to submit to a
medical exam by the opposing party's physician when the plaintiff had no
reasonable ground for refusing.
136
B. United States
1. Federal and State Authority
Although the United States Constitution reserves responsibility for
public health to the states, the federal government has the power to legis-
late for interstate and international health problems.1 37 The federal gov-
ernment derives its power to regulate for interstate and international
public health from its power to regulate interstate commerce, levy taxes,
and appropriate money for the general welfare.138 The remaining power
to regulate public health is reserved to the states by the Constitution and
is part of the states' police power.
13 9
Historically, the power to regulate public health has remained with
the states. For example, in 1799 Congress assumed that quarantine was
a local function and directed that federal officials merely assist the states
in their execution of the state laws."4o Chief Justice Marshall declared in
1824 that quarantine acts and other health laws are best exercised by the
states and cannot be surrendered to the federal government.' 4 ' A 1905
Supreme Court case acknowledged a state's authority to enact reasonable
134. Id. at 364-66.
135. Id. at 360; Starr v. National Coal Board, 1 W.L.R. 63, 75 (1977); S v. McC, 1972 A.C.
24, 47-59 (1970).
136. Starr, 1 W.L.R. 63, 75.
137. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1, 3, 8. See generally Morgenstern, supra note 46, at 544-46;
Tobey, supra note 103, at 126-29.
138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3, 8.
139. "The police power is the right inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitu-
tional limitations, to promote the health, safety, morals, order, comfort, and general welfare of
the people. The power is, obviously, very broad and involves the right to restrict the use of
liberty and property." Tobey, supra note 103, at 126. The power is reserved to the states by
the tenth amendment. U.S. CONsT. amend. X; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 112-
16 (1824).
140. See Edelman, supra note 16, at 30.
141. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 112-16.
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regulations to preserve the health and safety of its citizens. 142 In later
cases the Court said states are free to adopt public health regulations that
do not conflict with federal action.
143
The federal government nevertheless plays a role in health laws
through direct regulation of interstate commerce (including food, drugs,
and hazardous substances shipped between states), and through coopera-
tion with and assistance to the states. In 1879 Congress created the Na-
tional Board of Health to promote state development of health
programs.'" Prior to the 1930s, however, intervention of the federal
government in public health through legislating health laws was thought
to violate substantive due process.' 45 Increased federal power during the
Depression led to reconsideration of constitutional restrictions on federal
health laws and expanded the role of the federal government.' 46 In 1934,
the United States Supreme Court held that due process conditions, but
does not prohibit, the exercise of federal regulatory power for the public
welfare.147 In 1935 the Social Security Act 148 authorized federal investi-
gations of methods to control communicable disease and granted federal
aid to state and local health departments. 49 In 1944 the Public Health
Service Act' s empowered the federal communicable disease center to
investigate disease and quarantine the ill. 151
Current federal law allows for measures to prevent the spread of
disease by people traveling between states and from foreign countries.1
5 2
In addition, the federal government assists in local health matters by
142. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding mandatory vaccination).
143. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 406-08 (1913).
144. Morgenstern, supra note 46, at 542.
145. For a discussion of substantive due process, see infra notes 187-194 and accompany-
ing text.
146. Morgenstern, supra note 46, at 542-43.
147. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
148. 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
149. Morgenstern, supra note 46, at 543.
150. 58 Stat. 682 (1944).
151. Edelman, supra note 16, at 35.
152. Regulations to Control Communicable Diseases, 42 U.S.C. § 264 (1982). Under
§ 264(d), the National Advisory Health Council may recommend that regulations be used for:
the apprehension and examination of any individual reasonably believed to be in-
fected with a communicable disease in a communicable stage and (1) to be moving or
about to move from a State to another State; or (2) to be a probable source of infec-
tion to individuals who, while infected with such disease in a communicable stage,
will be moving from a State to another State .... [S]uch individual ... may be
detained for such time and in such manner as may be reasonably necessary.
Section 266 gives the federal government special quarantine powers in wartime to examine and
detain any person believed to be infected with a disease or who may infect members of the
armed forces or those engaged in production of supplies for the armed forces. 42 C.F.R.
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funding and cooperating with state and local governments, and by for-
mulating guidelines and regulations for local health authorities. 153 Most
power, including the power to quarantine victims and carriers of disease,
however, remains with the states.
State codes provide for quarantine of victims and carriers of certain
communicable diseases, but vary in the procedures specified and in the
consequences of noncompliance with health department orders.' 54 Cali-
fornia's Health and Safety Code allows the Department of Health to
quarantine individuals if, in the judgment of a department official, "such
action is necessary to protect or preserve public health." '55 The Code
provides that health officials may "take possession or control of a per-
son" to carry out its authority.1 56 A specific section relating to tubercu-
losis requires that there be "reasonable grounds" for quarantine of
tuberculosis patients.' 57 Violations of orders issued by the Health De-
partment as well as willful exposure of another person to disease are mis-
demeanors punishable by fines and a maximum of ninety days in jail.'5 8
New York has similar quarantine regulations, but its public health
law contains more detailed provisions for willful exposure.1 59 If a patient
is unable or unwilling to conduct himself or herself in a manner so as not
to expose others to the disease, a health officer is empowered to make an
investigation and file a complaint with a judge.160 If the judge is satisfied
that the complaint is well-founded, the patient will be committed to a
hospital or institution. 161 Hospital officials may later discharge the pa-
tient when they deem it appropriate.'62 The law specifically authorizes
the right to appeal the magistrate's decision.
163
§§ 71.1-71.35 (1986) specify regulations for quarantine at United States ports to prevent intro-
duction of disease into the nation.
153. 42 C.F.R. §§ 67.101-67.118 (1986) allow for federal grants for state and local health
services research centers, and set standards and regulations for the centers to follow. 21
C.F.R. 1240.3-1340.905 (1986) provide for travel restrictions, reporting disease, and inspection
to prevent spread of disease among states.
154. Connecticut's quarantine laws were extensively revised in 1984. See infra notes 257-
259 and accompanying text.
155. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 3051, 3053, 3115-3117, 3123 (West 1979).
156. Id. § 3053.
157. Id. § 3285.
158. Id. §§ 3350-3354. "Willful exposure" as used in this context refers to a diseased indi-
vidual intentionally and knowingly exposing unknowing individuals to his or her contagious
disease.
159. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2120-2124 (McKinney 1985).
160. Id. § 2120(2).
161. Id. § 2120(3).
162. Id. § 2120(5).
163. Id. § 2124.
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Colorado's public health laws provide for isolation of persons who
are found to pose a danger of communicating contagious diseases in light
of evidence discovered after investigation by a health officer. 1" Specific
sections allow officials to examine those reasonably suspected of carrying
venereal diseases and to quarantine those infected.165
Texas law allows quarantine if a judge reasonably suspects that an
individual is infected with a communicable disease or if a patient fails to
comply with a health department order.1 66 The patient is specifically
given the right to a hearing before he or she is quarantined and to consult
counsel. 167 After detention, the patient has the right to institute a
habeas corpus action. 168 Texas has more severe penalties for knowing
refusal to abide by health department control measures than most other
states; such a refusal is a third-degree felony. 169 Willful exposure of
others to disease is a misdemeanor.
170
2. Impact of the United States Constitution
The gradual expansion of constitutional rights by the United States
Supreme Court has restricted the states' broad police power to legislate
for public health and required the courts to balance individuals' rights
and liberties against the protection of public health. The rights that limit
authority to make health laws include equal protection, substantive and
procedural due process, and privacy.
a. Equal Protection
The fourteenth amendment right to equal protection of the laws re-
quires states to treat each individual equally in drafting and administer-
ing its laws. Equal protection is denied when laws or regulations classify
individuals, and either distinguish between persons who should be re-
garded as similarly situated or do not distinguish between persons who
should be regarded as differently situated.1 7 1 To survive constitutional
challenge, a classification must be rationally related to a legitimate state
164. COLo. REV. STAT. § 25-1-650 (1982).
165. Id. §§ 25-4-404 to 405.
166. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4419b-1, § 4.02(b)-(d) (Vernon Supp. 1987). Quar-
antine of lepers was mandated by Texas law as recently as 1977. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 4439 (Vernon 1976) (repealed 1977).
167. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4419b-1, § 4.02(d) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
168. Id.
169. Id. § 6.02.
170. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4419b-1, §§ 6.04, 6.05 (Vernon Supp. 1987). See
infra note 244 and accompanying text for an example of application of this law.
171. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrIrUIONAL LAW § 16-1, at 993 (1978).
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objective. 172 If state action abridges a fundamental right or creates a
class based on suspect criteria, 173 however, a higher standard of equal
protection applies. Such a law is subject to strict scrutiny by the courts.
In this situation, the state has the heavier burden of showing the classifi-
cation bears a substantial relationship to furthering a compelling govern-
mental interest, and the state must choose the least drastic means to
accomplish its purpose by using a narrowly tailored law. 174  Further-
more, even if a law does not contain classifications, it may still abridge
equal protection if it is administered in such a way that it discriminates
unreasonably. 1
75
Courts have applied the rational basis standard in deciding the va-
lidity of various public health regulations enforced against particular
groups of people. For example, a 1900 San Francisco ordinance that
required only Chinese and Asiatic persons to be inoculated against
bubonic plague before they left the city was found unconstitutional be-
cause it violated equal protection. 176 The court held that the racial clas-
sification was not rationally related to the objective of preventing the
spread of disease. 
177
Quarantine of group members suspected of being infected with vene-
real diseases has also been challenged on equal protection grounds. In
1921 the California Court of Appeal relied on the equal protection guar-
172. Id. § 16-2, at 995. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Rinaldi v. Yeager,
384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886).
173. A fundamental right is one explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973). A suspect class is one
saddled with disabilities, subjected to a history of unequal treatment, or relegated to a position
of political powerlessness so that it needs extraordinary protection from the majoritarian polit-
ical process. Id. at 28. AIDS carriers, gays, and intravenous drug users arguably possess these
characteristics. Rights of AIDS Carriers, supra note 15, at 1278.
174. San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 411 U.S. at 16-17.
175. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-74. In general, public emergencies diminish the importance
of constitutional rights such as equal protection, and courts are reluctant to invalidate state
laws designed to cope with the emergency. For example, in Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944), the Court upheld explicit racial discrimination to ensure national security
when it sustained a military order excluding Japanese Americans from areas of the West Coast
during World War II. The majority opinion concluded that "the presence of an unascertained
number of disloyal members of [Japanese Americans], most of whom we have no doubt were
loyal to this country," deemed the exclusion of all necessary because "it was impossible to
bring about an immediate segregation of the disloyal from the loyal." Korematsu, 323 U.S. at
218-19. See also the British case of Liversidge v. Anderson, 1942 A.C. 206, 207, which also
upheld the detention of a person of "hostile association" during World War II for security
reasons. In Liversidge, the administrator's decision was allowed to stand because the court's
only consideration was the administrator's good faith. Id. at 224.
176. Wong Wai v. Williamson, 103 F. 1, 9 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900).
177. Id. at 8.
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antee in holding that a prostitute could not lawfully be quarantined
solely because she was a prostitute. 178 The court stated that her constitu-
tional guarantees to personal liberty required more than a mere suspicion
that she had venereal disease. 179 The prevalence of venereal disease in
the military during World War II led to renewed efforts to control it
through quarantine of prostitutes.'8 0 In 1944 the Attorney General of
Florida argued in favor of such measures:
The problem of venereal disease suppression cannot be disassociated
from the problem of vice control ....
Any campaign directed at the suppression of communicable dis-
eases must of necessity depend for its success upon the segregation and
treatment of infected persons ....
While quarantine provisions cut deeply into private personal
rights, the subject is one respecting which a mincing policy is not to be
tolerated. It affects the public health so intimately and so insidiously,
that considerations of delicacy and privacy may not be permitted to
thwart measures necessary to avert the public peril ....
For the most part these diseases are all associated with either
commercial vice or amateur promiscuity. Of course there are excep-
tions, cases where the infected person has been guilty of no immorality,
no promiscuity, but by and large venereal disease infections are found
among a class which cannot be trusted to observe a self imposed isola-
tion ....
[Quarantine is established by health authorities and does not re-
quire a judicial determination either of infection or of the necessity for
isolation. Obviously such a requirement would render laws for the
protection of the public health nugatory.
18 '
Subsequently, a California court upheld quarantine of a group of
prostitutes in 1948 because they were in a class of persons more likely
than not to be infected with venereal disease."8 2 The court based its deci-
sion on a local health officer's testimony that four cases of venereal dis-
178. In re Shepard, 51 Cal. App. 49, 51, 195 P. 1077, 1077 (1921).
179. Id.
180. Petteway, supra note 36, at 13.
181. Id. at 13-14, 16, 21-22.
182. In re Martin, 83 Cal. App. 2d 164, 167-68, 188 P.2d 287, 289-90 (1948). The Martin
court cited In re Shepard, 51 Cal. App. at 51, 195 P. at 1077, but distinguished it on the
ground that the Shepard court found the facts were insufficient to establish reason to believe
the prostitute was infected. The Martin court stated, "whether or not a quarantine order is
justified depends upon the facts of each individual case, and the obvious corollary thereof is
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ease had reportedly been contracted at the women's apartment house,
and the court found there was probable cause to believe that prostitutes,
as a class, were infected.183 The dissent, however, argued strongly that
the evidence did not support the conclusion, that even a prostitute was
entitled to fundamental liberties, and that the zeal of health officers
should not transcend constitutional rights of an accused.
184
As recently as 1973, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit upheld as constitutional a Denver ordinance allowing de-
tention of anyone arrested for a sex offense in order to examine and treat
him or her for venereal disease.' 5 The court stated that detention is a
reasonable infringement of liberty in light of the social costs of the dis-
ease and found a rational presumption that those arrested were likely to
be infected." 6
b. Substantive Due Process
Under the doctrine of substantive due process, laws made by the
states under the police power are subject to judicial review to ensure that
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution are not infringed
upon.'8 7 If a law limits the fundamental rights of individual citizens, it
must be no broader than necessary, it must be rational and reasonable (as
determined by the court), and it must be necessary to promote a compel-
ling or overriding interest of the government.
18
Since 1937 the United States Supreme Court has limited the applica-
tion of substantive due process analysis to laws affecting fundamental
rights and has deferred to state legislative judgments on economic and
social welfare matters.' 9 Even when laws affect fundamental rights,
some courts tend to uphold the law if there is any conceivable argument
that it is related to a legitimate governmental end. For example, the
that what may appear to be sufficient to one person may not appear to be sufficient to an-
other." Id. at 168, 188 P.2d at 290.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 173, 182, 188 P.2d at 293, 298 (Adams, J., dissenting).
185. Reynolds v. McNichols, 488 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1973).
186. Id. at 1382-83.
187. See 2 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK, & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 14.6, at 13-15 (1986) [hereinafter ROTUNDA]. See, e.g., New Motor Vehicle Board of Cali-
fornia v. Orrin Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978); Chicago Railroad v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418
(1890); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905);
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Fed. Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline, 315 U.S.
590 (1938).
188. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56; ROTUNDA, supra note 187, at 13-15.
189. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See ROTUNDA,
supra note 187, § 15.4, at 59.
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Fifth Circuit noted, "Only when a law is a totally arbitrary deprivation
of liberty will it violate the substantive due process guarantee."1 90
Because quarantine necessarily infringes upon the fundamental right
of liberty,191 laws imposing quarantine are subject to judicial review to
ensure they meet the requirements of substantive due process. For exam-
ple, a California case involving the San Francisco bubonic plague out-
break in 1900 held that quarantine of the city's Chinese district was
unconstitutional.'92 In its review of the state's exercise of police power,
the court considered whether the law was reasonable and necessary
under the circumstances, and whether it was designed to accomplish the
purpose intended. Because it served no legitimate purpose and was unre-
lated to preventing the spread of disease, the law was found to be unrea-
sonable and oppressive, and therefore in violation of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 1
93
In 1922 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the partial quarantine of
a typhoid carrier, but only after thoroughly scrutinizing the regulations
utilized to ensure they were not arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable:
Health authorities cannot promulgate and enforce rules which merely
have a tendency to prevent the spread of contagious and infectious dis-
eases, which are not founded upon an existing condition or upon a
well- founded belief that a condition is threatened which will endanger
the public health. The health authorities cannot interfere with the lib-
erties of a citizen until the emergency actually exists....
Effective quarantine must therefore be not so much the isolation
of the person who is sick or affected with the disease as a prevention of
the communication of the disease germs from the sick to the well....
Quarantine, in the very nature of the regulation, is not a definite or
uniform measure, but it must vary according to the subject. One of the
important elements in the administration of health and quarantine reg-
ulations is a full measure of common sense.'
94
190. Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1176 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting J. NOWAK,
R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 410 (1978)).
191. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1974). Quarantine may also impair other
fundamental rights. See generally NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)
(freedom of association); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (privacy); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (the right of interstate travel). See ROTUNDA, supra note 187, § 17.4, at
223; Rights of AIDS Carriers, supra note 15, at 1282.
192. Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900).
193. Id. at 20-21, 24, 26. Because the law also singled out the Asian community, the court
held that the law violated equal protection. Id. at 26.
194. People ex rel. Barmore v. Robertson, 302 II. 422, 433-34, 134 N.E. 815, 819-20 (1922)
(citations omitted).
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c. Procedural Due Process
Recent controversy over civil commitment of mentally ill individu-
als and detention of tuberculosis patients has increased judicial sensitivity
to unnecessary restraints. Many courts have required that these patients
be given the procedural due process guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment. 195
The United States Supreme Court has not clearly specified the pro-
cedures required when persons are involuntarily committed to state insti-
tutions for mental treatment. But it is clear that such persons cannot be
detained without a fair procedure to determine whether they pose a dan-
ger to society or themselves.19 6 Furthermore, the duration of detention
must bear a rational relationship to the purpose of confinement.197 Vari-
ous state and federal courts have implemented these requirements and
also imposed others. For example, California courts have held that the
patient's interest in personal liberty is equally vital whether the patient is
deprived of freedom in a criminal or civil proceeding.198 Restrictions on
liberty, no matter how well-intentioned, require the close scrutiny af-
forded by the due process clause.1 9 Before individuals may be commit-
ted to hospitals or institutions because of mental illness, some courts
require that they be given a prompt, mandatory hearing to establish
probable cause for detention. 2" In addition, California law mandates
that the patient have an opportunity to consult counsel20 ' and the right
to a jury trial.20 2 Although the United States Supreme Court has re-
quired states at least to employ a "clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard" of the danger posed by the patient,20 3 California has required proof
195. See ROTUNDA, supra note 187, § 17.4, at 216-18; Mills, supra note 56, at 10.
196. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 567-76 (1975); McNeil v. Director, Patuxent
Inst., 407 U.S. 245, 249-50 (1972); State ex rel. Doe v. Madonna, 295 N.W.2d 356, 363 n.9
(Minn. 1980); see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 190, at 484.
197. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
198. Heap v. Roulet, 23 Cal. 3d 223-25, 590 P.2d 1, 3-4, 152 Cal. Rptr. 425, 426-28 (1979).
199. See People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 318-25, 535 P.2d 352, 359-64, 121 Cal. Rptr.
488, 495-500 (1975); People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 535 P.2d 373, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509
(1975); In re Watson, 91 Cal. App. 3d 455, 459, 154 Cal. Rptr. 151, 154-5 (1979); O'Brien v.
Superior Ct., 61 Cal. App. 3d 62, 132 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1976).
200. Doe v. Gallinot, 486 F. Supp. 983, 992 (C.D. Cal. 1979); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F.
Supp. 509, 515-16 (D. Neb. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 388 (M.D. Ala. 1974);
Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085, 1098 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1090-93 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
201. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5302 (West 1984).
202. Id.
203. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
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beyond a reasonable doubt. 2"
A recent case involving a recalcitrant tuberculosis patient who re-
fused to be treated provides an example of the types of procedural safe-
guards being instituted.2"5 In that case, the patient and the Los Angeles
County Department of Health, in a landmark settlement, established re-
quired procedures. The patient must receive a copy of the detention or-
der stating the reasons for his or her confinement.2a 6 A jury hearing
must be available if the patient requests one,20 7 in addition to representa-
tion by an attorney,20 8 and an evaluation by an independent physician.20 9
Nine of twelve jurors must agree that there is clear and convincing evi-
dence of current infectiousness, that the patient would not voluntarily
receive treatment, and that his or her release would constitute a threat to
public health.21 0
d. Privacy
Before the state can enact public health laws that intrude into inti-
mate human relations or expose intimate details of people's lives, it must
show a compelling interest sufficient to override their right to privacy.211
The United States Supreme Court has struck down state health laws that
infringe upon this fundamental right.2 12 The right of privacy has been
found to emanate from the "penumbra" of the Bill of Rights and is ap-
plied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. 21 The Court has
found privacy interests in marriage,214 decisions about procreation,215
and abortion.21 6 In Bowers v. Hardwick, however, the Court explicitly
refused to extend the federal constitutional right to privacy to confer a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in consensual sodomy in
204. Roulet, 23 Cal. 3d at 230-33, 590 P.2d at 7, 10, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 431-34; Feagley, 14
Cal. 3d at 351, 535 P.2d at 381, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
205. Balderas v. Pitchess, Civ. No. 000617 (Super. Ct. L.A. Cal. 1980). See also Mills,
supra note 56, at 1-2.
206. Balderas, Civ. No. 000617, at 4-6.
207. Id. at 17.
208. Id. at 9.
209. Id. at 10.
210. Id. at 18.
211. See Nichols, supra note 5, at 320.
212. See, eg., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86, 499 (1965) (law prohibiting
use of contraceptives even among married people held unconstitutional).
213. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481, 483-85; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973).
214. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86, 499.
215. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (law prohibiting use of contraceptives
among unmarried persons invalidated).
216. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113 (law that prohibited abortions unless necessary to save mother's
life held unconstitutional).
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the privacy of their homes.21 7
State regulations limiting privacy rights must be justified by a com-
pelling state interest, and the law must be narrowly drawn to express
only legitimate state interests.218 The scope of the privacy right has re-
cently been broadened to include a general individual interest in avoiding
disclosures of personal matters and in making certain kinds of important
decisions with regard to one's own body.2 19 Some courts have held the
right to privacy in sexual matters protects disclosure of one's "associa-
tional activities" (including sexual partners), and the state must show
much more than a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest
before it can compel such disclosure.220 A 1985 Florida case prevented
discovery of blood donors' names when a transfusion recipient developed
AIDS and sought civil recovery from the donors.22 ' The Florida Court
of Appeal held that the donors had a constitutional privacy interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters concerning sex practices, drug
use, and medical histories in light of the social ostracism associated with
AIDS.
2 2 2
V. AIDS QUARANTINE LAWS AND PROPOSALS
Although the drafters of England's quarantine measure for AIDS
intended its use to be restricted to rare and exceptional cases, the law has
already been applied to quarantine an apparently inappropriate pa-
tient.22 3 Similar laws in the United States that may be applied to quaran-
tine persons with AIDS may not survive constitutional challenge and are
likely to prove ineffective even if upheld.
217. Bowers v. Hardwick, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986). The Court upheld Georgia's
sodomy statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1982), which bans all acts of sodomy including
those between members of the opposite sex. The statute provides that "[a] person commits the
offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of
one person and the mouth or anus of another." The Court did not reach the issue of whether
the statute as applied to sodomy between heterosexuals is constitutional. Id. at 2842 n.2.
218. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
219. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). The right to privacy may also affect the
state's power to legislate for mandatory immunization, Comment, An Evaluation oflmmuniza-
tion Regulations in Light of Religious Objections and the Developing Right of Privacy, 4 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 401 (1979), and for testing for genetic defects, Dabbs, Constitutional and
Practical Considerations in Mandatory Sickle Cell Anemia Testing, 7 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 509,
516-18 (1974); Damme, Controlling Genetic Disease Through Law, 15 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
801, 818-20 (1982).
220. Eg., South Florida Blood Service, Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 801-04 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
221. Id. at 800.
222. Id. at 802.




In February 1985 an AIDS patient in England attempted to dis-
charge himself from the hospital with a fixed catheter in his vein.224 The
catheter could have provided the means for infection of others if his
blood had entered someone else's bloodstream. This incident led to a
move in Parliament to make AIDS a notifiable disease.225 If AIDS were
made notifiable, all sections of the Public Health Act of 1984 would ap-
ply to the disease.226 After much debate, Parliament decided making
AIDS notifiable would not assist in the control of the disease.227 Based
on its previous experience with venereal diseases, Parliament determined
that patients would not come forward for treatment or studies.228 Brit-
ain's Secretary of State for Social Services stated the government's
solution:
There might be very rare and exceptional cases where the nature
of a patient's condition would place him in a dangerously infectious
state which would make it desirable to admit him or to detain him in
hospital. There has not so far been any such case, nor are we aware of
any present risk of one. We are satisfied that we need to take powers
now to be in a position to protect the public in the event of such a risk
arising. It is my intention, therefore, to lay regulations under the Pub-
lic Health [Control of Disease] Act [ofl 1984 which would give reserve
powers to authorities to detain a patient when he is in a dangerously
infectious condition.
I must stress that these powers have no relevance to the over-
whelming majority of AIDS patients. We have no intention of dealing
with AIDS patients generally under greater restraints than other pa-
tients. We need these reserve powers for the very rare case that might
eventually arise somewhere some time.229
Sections of the Public Health Act made applicable were those providing
for mandatory medical exams, removal to and detention in a hospital,
and removal of and isolation of bodies.230 The new regulations also mod-
ified the section allowing detention in a hospital.23 Judges may order
detention if satisfied that a patient would not take proper precautions to
224. AIDS May Be Made a Notifiable Disease, The Times (London), Feb. 11, 1985, at 3,
col. 3.
225. Id.
226. PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 498-500 (1985).
227. Id. at 499.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See supra notes 110-115 and accompanying text.
231. Public Health Reg., S.I. 1985, No. 434.
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prevent the spread of disease outside the hospital.232
The new English law was first used to detain a patient in September
1985.233 An AIDS patient in Manchester expressed his wish to leave the
hospital where he was being treated for AIDS-related illnesses, but he
did not try to leave. The city's medical officer requested that detention
be ordered by the city magistrate because his release "would be very dan-
gerous. '2 34 At a five-minute hearing on September 14, 1985, based solely
on the medical officer's request, the magistrate ordered the patient de-
tained for three weeks, with indefinite extensions. The patient was not
represented by counsel. The Terence Higgins Trust, established to help
AIDS victims, appealed the decision.235 The order was overturned on
September 24, but the judge said that the prior decision was proper be-
cause, at the time it was rendered, the patient's condition was worse.
2 36
Since his condition had improved substantially and the appeal was unop-
posed, the order was lifted. When asked whether the risk of contamina-
tion by the patient had ended, the medical officer told the judge, "The
evidence which I now have is such that I could not seek to justify his
detention.... 237
B. United States
The move for AIDS quarantine in the United States was initially
prompted by media reports of recalcitrant patients who refused to ab-
stain from sexual relations or inform their partners after being diagnosed
with AIDS. For example, an Alameda, California man was treated sev-
eral times for gonorrhea at a public health clinic after being diagnosed
with AIDS. 238 He claimed to have had sex with three to five men per
week without telling them of his condition.239 In Houston, Texas a male
prostitute with AIDS vowed to continue to have sex with strangers, de-
spite urgings of doctors and health officials.24 Members of the commu-
232. Id.
233. Court Orders Man to Remain in Hospital, The Times (London), Sept. 16, 1985, at 3,
col. 1; British Hospital Attempts AIDS Quarantine But Loses in Court, The Advocate, Oct. 29,
1985, at 22, col. 1.
234. Court Orders Man to Remain in Hospital, supra note 233, at 3, col. 2.
235. Id.
236. Judge Lifts Detention Order on AIDS Man, The Times (London), Sept. 25, 1985, at 3,
col. 7.
237. Id.
238. Adler, supra note 5, at 18.
239. Id.
240. Anti-Gay Crusade in Houston, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 24, 1985 at 4, cols. 2-3.
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nity finally persuaded the individual to check into a hospital for
treatment.
The Texas Health Commissioner requested in November 1985 that
AIDS be added to the list of quarantinable diseases.24 x As with the Brit-
ish AIDS quarantine measure, the intent was to order quarantine only in
"extraordinary cases," in which an "unmanageable person" poses a pub-
lic health threat by engaging in activities, sexual or otherwise, that could
spread the disease.242 The proposal was strongly criticized by the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union, which stated that the "draconian nature of
quarantine" renders it useless in controlling a disease like AIDS, since
quarantine has been effective only for diseases spread by casual con-
tact.243 While the debate went on, the city of San Antonio sent letters to
the seventeen local AIDS victims which stated that they would be sent to
prison for two to ten years if any shared hypodermic needles, donated
blood or body organs, or had sexual contact with someone who did not
have AIDS. 2" Although the quarantine proposal received tentative ap-
proval from the Texas Board of Health, the Commissioner withdrew it in
January 1986, stating that the battle against AIDS requires a high degree
of trust and cooperation between the gay community and the health de-
partment. He thought this would be jeopardized by implementing the
quarantine. 245
In California, prompted by reports of recalcitrant patients, the chief
of the infectious disease section of the Department of Health Services
proposed a policy to quarantine AIDS patients' residences by posting
signs on their homes indicating that a person who resides there has a
communicable disease.246 This action would be carried out if there were
a documented failure of the patient to follow health department recom-
mendations and an AIDS support group could not help the patient
change his or her behavior.247 The proposal stressed that all attempts at
voluntary compliance must be exhausted before quarantine would be im-
241. Texas to Request AIDS Quarantine, supra note 5, at 19, col. 5.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 19, col. 6.
244. The New AIDS Risk: A Term in Jail, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 28, 1985, at 98. See supra
note 170 and accompanying text for the statute giving the city such authority. An even less
sensitive proposal was inadvertently broadcast on Houston television when a former five-term
mayor of Houston suggested that one solution to the AIDS epidemic was "to shoot the
queers." A Nasty Gaffe in Houston About Gays, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 26, 1985, at 4, col.
6.
245. Texas Drops AIDS Patient Quarantine, San Francisco Chron., Jan. 17, 1986, at 25,
cols. 3-4.
246. Nichols, supra note 5, at 341; Pagano, supra note 5.
247. Nichols, supra note 5, at 340.
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posed.2 a" An attorney for the state Office of Legal Services agreed that
such patients could be quarantined under the conditions outlined because
their constitutional rights would not outweigh measures necessary for
public health. 4 9 Due to privacy considerations, however, she strongly
cautioned against the release of names to support groups unless it could
be shown to be an absolutely necessary and effective means of protecting
the public health. The attorney also stated that quarantine of homes
would be unrelated to the desired goal, and that general regulations for
posting placards in quarantine situations had been repealed in 1957.250
As of November 1986, the proposal had not been enacted, and there were
no further reports of action on it.
Supporters of past presidential candidate Lyndon LaRouche suc-
cessfully placed an AIDS initiative on the California ballot for the No-
vember 1986 election. 51 The proposition was defeated by more than a
two-to-one margin,2 5 2 and its opponents included most of the California
248. Pagano, supra note 5, at 17.
249. Nichols, supra note 5, at 342-43.
250. Id. at 343.
251. The text of the initiative, which is the first AIDS quarantine measure to be put before
voters in the United States, is as follows:
Section 1. The purpose of this Act is to: A. Enforce and confirm the declaration of
the California Legislature ... that acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) is
serious and life threatening to men and women from all segments of society, that
AIDS is usually lethal and that it is caused by an infectuous [sic] agent with a high
concentration of cases in California;
B. Protect victims of [AIDS], members of their families and local communi-
ties, and the public health at large; and
C. Utilize the existing structure of the State Department of Health Services
and local health officers and the statutes and regulations under which they serve to
preserve the public health from [AIDS].
Section 2. [AIDS] is an infectuous [sic], contagious and communicable disease and
the condition of being a carrier of the HTLV-III virus is an infectuous [sic], conta-
gious and communicable condition and both shall be placed and maintained by the
director of the Department of Health Services on the list of reportable diseases and
conditions.. . , and both shall be included within the provisions of [the portions of
the Health and Safety Code and Administrative Code allowing quarantine, isolation,
exclusion from school and food-handling jobs, and travel restriction, inter alia], and
all personnel of the Department of Health Services and all health officers shall fulfill
all of the duties and obligations specified in each and all of the sections of said statu-
tory division and administrative code subchapter in a manner consistent with the
intent of this Act, as shall all other persons identified in said provisions."
CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 90, at 49. A federal judge forced the proponents
to delete two sentences from a ballot pamphlet argument that stated, "AIDS is not hard to get;
it's easy to get," and "potential insect and respiratory transmission has been established by
numerous studies." The judge concluded the statements were false and misleading opinions.
Kriegers, Proposition 64: Threat of the Unknown, San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 19, 1986, at
A-l i, col. 7.
252. San Francisco Chron., Nov. 6, 1986, at 10, col. 6.
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medical establishment and Republican and Democratic candidates for
both governor and United States senator.253 If it had passed, the new law
would have made AIDS and the condition of being a carrier of the AIDS
virus a reportable disease.254 Furthermore, it provided that AIDS pa-
tients and carriers would be considered to have an infectious, contagious,
and communicable disease. Thus, public health officers would have been
mandated to protect public health by utilizing existing laws to exclude
AIDS patients and carriers from schools and public employment, to limit
their travel, and to quarantine them.
A bill introduced in the Illinois legislature in November 1985 would
create a panel of seven doctors to develop an "AIDS Contagion Control
System."2 This system could recommend that the state public health
department quarantine AIDS victims "where such quarantining would
be effective and prudent in contagion control." '256
Connecticut extensively revised the quarantine section of its Public
Health Code in June 1984 to allow quarantine of persons with communi-
cable diseases who are a public threat because they are unable or unwill-
ing to prevent exposure to others.257 The Connecticut code allows the
patient the right to an attorney and a court hearing within seventy-two
hours.25 8 The court must determine, by clear and convincing evidence,
whether the patient is infected with a communicable disease and poses a
substantial threat to public health, and whether confinement is a neces-
sary and least restrictive means of preventing exposure.25 9 In his
thoughtful consideration of the new law, Professor Alvin Novick of Yale
University notes that it has not been established whether the law is or
will be applicable to AIDS patients or carriers of the HIV virus, but that
"[i]f it is to be applied, procedures must be established that are so sensi-
tive and rational that they can be understood by reasonable people to be
necessary, appropriate, respectful of persons, beneficent, and fair."26 0
Federal action on AIDS has been limited primarily to funding re-
search programs and providing assistance to local health departments.
However, debate on an appropriations bill that included funding for
253. Barabak, Few Favor LaRouche's AIDS Initiative, San Francico Chron., Oct. 15, 1986,
at 7, col. 1.
254. See supra note 25 1.
255. See Higham, supra note 5, at 25, col. 2.
256. Id.
257. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-221 (West 1986), as amended by 1984 Conn. Acts 336
(Reg. Sess.).
258. Id. § 19a-221(c), (e).
259. Id. § 19a-221(e), (i).
260. Novick, supra note 5, at 81.
19861
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
AIDS research in 1986 was lively.2 61 The bill included an amendment to
empower the Surgeon General to use funds to quarantine any bathhouse
or massage parlor that might facilitate transmission of AIDS.2 62 In op-
position to the amendment, Representative Waxman noted that the Sur-
geon General already has such authority, and the authority is limited
because most responsibility for control of infectious disease has tradition-
ally been left to state and local authorities.263
Numerous proposals for AIDS quarantine have also been advanced
by groups and individuals. In November 1985, Dr. Veron Mark, a
Harvard professor and neurosurgeon, proposed that Massachussetts de-
clare AIDS a "dangerous transmissible disease," which would allow
quarantine of "irresponsible" carriers on an island that was used as a
leper colony until the early twentieth century.2" He also proposed test-
ing of all venereal disease carriers and drug addicts. Spokesmen for the
Massachussets Health Department said it had no plans to impose such a
quarantine.265 Another Harvard medical professor has prepared
"standby regulations" for cities to use if necessary to confine willful
transmitters of AIDS.266 The regulations provide for progressively more
stringent confinement if a patient refuses to use voluntary controls.267
Two scientific research organizations have proposed an AIDS study
to be performed for the military.2 68 It would be aimed at proving AIDS
is casually transmitted, implementing procedures that would prevent ser-
vicemen from associating with high-risk groups, quarantining those ex-
posed to AIDS, and requiring "mandatory and overt identification" of
those exposed.2 69 The researchers conceded that some of the measures
261. H.R. 3424, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H8008-44 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1985)
[hereinafter H.R. 3424].
262. H.R. 3424, at H8030.
263. Id. at H8032 (statement of Rep. Waxman). In April 1986, the State Department
proposed a rule that would add AIDS to a list of seven diseases for which permanent immi-
grants to the United States are excluded. The proposed rule would effectively require all inuni-
grants entering the United States as permanent residents to be tested for exposure to AIDS.
US. May Ban Aliens with AIDS, San Francisco Chron., April 25, 1986, at 26, col. 1.
264. Quarantine for AIDS?, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 25, 1985, at 6.
265. Id.
266. Adler, supra note 5, at 18.
267. Id. at 24.
268. The organizations are the Advanced Investigation of Medical Science Group (AIMS)
and the Institute for Cancer Research. Both have done previous research for the military; the
AIMS Group has researched classified work on biological and chemical warfare. Two of the
researchers are senior scholars of the Hoover Institute at Stanford University, a conservative
research center. "Extreme" Proposal by AIDS Researchers, San Francisco Examiner, Feb. 9,
1986, at A-I, A-20, col. 4.
269. Id. at Al, col. 1. The identification method alludes to the yellow Star of David re-
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would be in direct conflict with the Constitution.
270
Paul Cameron, a decertified psychologist and consultant to Califor-
nia Representative Dannemeyer, advocates quarantine of all AIDS pa-
tients and carriers, and predicts such quarantine measures will be in
place by 1987.271 A Washington Post article by neurologist Richard
Restak calls for quarantine of AIDS victims, but not carriers, and argues
that because quarantine is not a civil rights issue, only medical considera-
tions should dictate its validity.
272
C. Constitutional Problems
If laws similar to the English AIDS quarantine law were applied in
the United States, they would pose several problems with respect to
United States constitutional rights. This section will analyze the consti-
tutional problems posed by the British law and by the various laws and
proposals that may be used in the United States to quarantine AIDS
patients.
1. Equal Protection
The constitutionality of AIDS quarantine laws depends largely on
whether they are subject to the "strict scrutiny" standard of equal pro-
tection.273 The strict scrutiny standard must apply if courts conclude
that quarantine of some or all AIDS carriers abridges a fundamental
right or affects a class based on suspect criteria. 74 Any law that provides
for involuntary detention, as in quarantine, necessarily involves loss of
liberty and thus impairs fundamental rights.275 Those quarantined would
also lose the fundamental rights of freedom of association, interstate
travel, and privacy.2 76 Therefore, quarantine laws should be subject to
strict scrutiny. Under that standard the state has a heavy burden of
showing a compelling governmental interest in the quarantine of those
persons affected by the law. Additionally, the law must be narrowly
quired to be worn by all Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe. The proposal also suggests a scenario
in which the AIDS virus spreads rapidly into the general population, infecting 10% of the
population of the United States and 68.2% of the military, and resulting in several hundred
million deaths during the next ten years. Id.
270. Id. at A-1, col. 2.
271. Fettner, The Evil that Men Do, New York Native, Sept. 23, 1985, at 23.
272. Restak, Worry About Survival of Society First; Then AIDS Victims' Rights, Washing-
ton Post, Sept. 8, 1985, at Cl, col. 1.
273. See supra notes 173-174 and accompanying text.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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drawn to employ the least drastic means to accomplish its purpose.277
If courts for some reason determine that this heightened scrutiny
does not apply, the law's classification of those to be quarantined only
need to be rationally related to a legitimate state objective.278 States
could more easily demonstrate a rational relationship between quarantin-
ing a group of people and preventing the spread of AIDS than they could
prove quarantine constitutes the least drastic means of accomplishing
that objective.
2 79
If the English AIDS quarantine law28° were reviewed under the
United States constitutional requirements of equal protection, the gov-
ernment might not be able to meet its heavy burden of demonstrating the
law is the least drastic means of controlling AIDS. Because the AIDS
law is limited to those situations in which a patient is dangerously infec-
tious and would not take proper precautions to prevent the spread of
disease, the law appears to be narrowly drawn to affect only AIDS pa-
tients who would willfully or recklessly spread the disease.281 Preventing
such behavior is probably a compelling governmental objective. Quaran-
tine of such patients, however, may not be the least drastic means of
accomplishing such an objective. Educating and counseling the patients
and, if required, imposing sanctions against them are reasonable alterna-
tives that could achieve the goal of controlling AIDS.282 Educating the
public to avoid unsafe sex is also a less restrictive and reasonable alterna-
tive to quarantine of those who will not take proper precautions to pre-
vent the spread of disease. Because the AIDS virus is so widespread and
the entire population is at some risk of being infected through unsafe sex,
everyone should take precautions to prevent infection. Individuals who
follow these recommendations thus cannot catch AIDS from either will-
ful transmitters or unknowing carriers. Sexual partners of these patients
could be infected only by consenting to participate in unsafe sexual prac-
tices. Like the English AIDS law, other laws in the United States used to
277. Almost all quarantine laws would arguably meet the rational relationship test. Quar-
antine of recalcitrant patients, AIDS carriers, and high risk groups, to varying degrees, all bear
a rational relationship to controlling the spread of AIDS.
278. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). See supra notes 191, 196-197 and accompa-
nying text.
279. See supra note 191.
280. See supra notes 229-232 and accompanying text.
281. The section of Britain's Public Health Act that allows medical exams of groups sus-
pected of carrying communicable disease was not made applicable to AIDS under the new
AIDS quarantine regulations. See supra notes 229-232 and accompanying text.
282. Such attempts also provide reasonable alternatives and less drastic means than quar-
antine of all AIDS patients or carriers.
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quarantine recalcitrant patients would pose similar constitutional
problems.
Even if the English law were constitutional per se under American
standards, its administration has proven, in at least one situtation, to be
discriminatory in violation of equal protection.283 The AIDS patient who
was quarantined after expressing a desire to leave the Manchester hospi-
tal284 may have been denied equal protection because he was unreasona-
bly singled out of a group of persons similarly situated (AIDS patients)
as one to be quarantined. No evidence suggested he was more danger-
ously infectious than other AIDS patients, 285 and he did not indicate that
he would not take proper precautions to prevent the spread of his disease.
Thus, his quarantine was an instance of unreasonable discrimination and
therefore a violation of the equal protection guarantee.
Existing United States quarantine laws286 are not a per se violation
of equal protection because they contain no unreasonable or suspect clas-
sifications. They are not, however, free from possible discriminatory ad-
ministration. As in the quarantine of prostitutes,287 quarantine of AIDS
carriers may sometimes be used as a political or social sanction against
minorities rather than for demonstrably valid public health reasons.288
Many states outlaw sodomy between homosexuals, 289 and such laws may
be used to justify quarantine of AIDS carriers. In addition, because cur-
rently most AIDS carriers are gay men,290 quarantine laws may be ap-
plied to AIDS as a social sanction against homosexuality.291 Such
unequal administration of the laws would violate equal protection.
Proposed laws that would quarantine all AIDS carriers, like the
1986 California initiative measure,292 probably could not survive strict
scrutiny. First, the government must demonstrate a compelling interest
furthered by such a law. While safeguarding the public health is clearly a
compelling interest, dispelling society's fear of disease is not. If legisla-
tures enact such quarantines merely in response to public hysteria, and
not for valid health reasons, the laws would not meet the compelling
state interest requirement.
283. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 233-237 and accompanying text.
285. Id.
286. See supra notes 154-170 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 178-186 and accompanying text.
288. Novick, supra note 5, at 82.
289. See supra note 217.
290. See supra note 77.
291. Nichols, supra note 5, at 329-38.
292. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, a law allowing quarantine of AIDS carriers would not
be sufficiently narrow to survive strict scrutiny. Because all AIDS carri-
ers are not necessarily infectious,293 laws providing for their quarantine
may be overbroad. Moreover, only carriers who are infectious and par-
ticipate in unsafe sexual practices294 or share needles can transmit the
disease. 295 Additionally, quarantine of high-risk groups, 29 6 such as gay
men, would prove similarly overbroad. Only some gay men are AIDS
carriers, and not all AIDS carriers are gay men,297 so such classifications
would not be substantially related to the goal of controlling the AIDS
epidemic. Finally, such laws might discourage persons who suspect they
have AIDS from coming forward for testing and treatment, thus defeat-
ing the objective. In sum, laws containing such classifications would be
overinclusive and tend to defeat the governmental interest in controlling
AIDS.
If only persons actually diagnosed with AIDS (AIDS patients) were
quarantined, such a quarantine may not bear a substantial relationship to
the objective of preventing the spread of AIDS. Although it would ar-
guably have some effect on the epidemic, the law would not account for
the spread of AIDS by carriers. Because quarantine of carriers also ap-
pears unconstitutional, 29 neither classification in an AIDS quarantine
law appears to be an acceptable, constitutional alternative.
Texas regulations imposing a prison sentence on AIDS patients who
engage in any sexual conduct are also overbroad.2 99 Since it is possible to
engage in sexual practices that pose no risk of transmission, the law goes
much further than necessary.
Moreover, quarantines are likely to be enforced arbitrarily since
those patients seeking public health care would be the ones most easily
identified by authorities."°° The English patient's arbitrary detention in
Manchester is an apt illustration of how quarantine could violate equal
protection by arbitrary enforcement.30'
293. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. Quarantine proposals also may advo-
cate detention of all sex offenders, prostitutes, or intravenous drug abusers. Similar equal pro-
tection problems would be posed by these classifications.
297. Rights of AIDS Carriers, supra note 15, at 1283.
298. Quarantining all AIDS carriers is also impractical. See infra notes 331-340 and ac-
companying text.
299. See supra notes 241-244 and accompanying text.
300. Rights of AIDS Carriers, supra note 15, at 1284.
301. See supra notes 233-237 and accompanying text.
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2. Substantive Due Process
Review of quarantine laws using a substantive due process analysis
is closely related to an analysis under the equal protection clause.
Although some decisions have upheld restrictions on liberty absent a "to-
tally arbitrary" basis for such a deprivation,3 "2 the substantive due pro-
cess guarantee generally requires that laws limiting fundamental rights
be no broader than necessary and bear a reasonable relationship to an
overriding governmental interest.303
Thus, a law like the English AIDS quarantine measure a3 4 may not
prove constitutional in the United States. Quarantining patients with
AIDS who fail to take precautions to prevent its spread (for example, by
engaging in unsafe sex) 305 bears a reasonable and nonarbitrary relation-
ship to preventing willful or reckless infection of others. However, if the
purpose of the law is to prevent the spread of AIDS, rather than to stop
only the willful spread of AIDS, the law's relationship to its purpose is
more tenuous.30 6 Some argue that these types of laws would have a mini-
mal effect on the epidemic, while depriving those quarantined of funda-
mental rights without any substantial public benefit.307 Nevertheless,
courts would probably find such a law to be reasonably related to check-
ing the AIDS epidemic.
There are, however, less restrictive means to accomplish these objec-
tives. The English law is broader than necessary because it does not re-
quire authorities to consider other alternatives, such as education and
counseling,30 8 before quarantine is imposed. For example, education
programs in San Francisco, New York, and London, designed to educate
the public about the risks of unsafe sex and how to change sexual prac-
tices, have resulted in a lower incidence of venereal disease among high
risk groups.30 9 Such programs are a reasonable, less restrictive alterna-
tive to quarantine. Thus, United States laws and proposals that would
quarantine AIDS patients and carriers without attempts to educate them
about how voluntarily to prevent infection would be broader than
necessary.310
302. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 229-232 and accompanying text.
305. See supra note 82.
306. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
307. See Novick, supra note 5, at 82.
308. See infra notes 331-340 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 241-272 and accompanying text. The 1983 California Health Depart-
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3. Procedural Due Process
Before an individual could be involuntarily detained pursuant to any
AIDS quarantine law in the United States, he or she must receive the
procedural safeguards guaranteed by the due process clause.311 At a
minimum, these safeguards must include a hearing to determine, by clear
and convincing evidence, that the individual poses a danger to himself or
society, and that the duration of the quarantine bears a rational relation-
ship to the purpose of confinement.312
The English AIDS measure violates procedural due process because
a judge only needs to be "satisfied" that a patient would not avoid trans-
mission if not confined.31 3 Thus, a mere suspicion that a patient will fail
to take precautions to prevent infecting others may be enough to satisfy
the judge that the patient should be quarantined. Confinement would
therefore be based on predictions and assumptions about future behavior
that may not be substantiated.314 Furthermore, the English law does not
require a prompt, mandatory hearing on probable cause even if re-
quested, and no jury trial is available.3" 5 It is evident that the English
law would violate United States procedural due process requirements.31 6
On the other hand, Connecticut law satisfies most procedural due
process requirements, except for the right to a jury trial.317 Other United
States proposals have not specified procedures to be used,318 so it is un-
clear whether they would violate due process rights if enacted.
4. Privacy
Although Bowers v. Hardwick held homosexuals have no fundamen-
tal right to engage in sodomy,319 it did not reach the issue of sodomy or
other sexual activity between men and women.320 Prior opinions protect-
ment proposal does allow for less restrictive measures than quarantine. See supra notes 246-
249 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 195-206 and accompanying text.
312. Id.
313. See supra notes 229-232 and accompanying text.
314. Rights of AIDS Carriers, supra note 15, at 1283-84.
315. In this situation, jury trials are not required by the United States Constitution, but are
required by some states. See supra notes 195-206 and accompanying text.
316. Application of the law would also violate procedural guarantees of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, as in the case of commitment of the mentally ill. See supra notes
123-126 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 257-259 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 241-272 and accompanying text.




ing the right to make decisions about one's own body321 and the right of
married persons to make certain decisions about sexual matters322 argua-
bly give AIDS carriers the right to engage in sexual relations with per-
sons of the opposite sex. Thus, quarantine laws intended to prevent such
individuals from engaging in any sexual relations may infringe on their
right to engage in safe heterosexual conduct.32 3
The English law could also infringe on such a right. English judges
may conclude AIDS patients who intend to have safe sex are not taking
"proper precautions" under the English AIDS quarantine law, and
therefore order them quarantined. 24 In addition, the determination of a
patient's sexual behavior will necessarily involve some observation or
documentation of behavior, which would be a serious infringement of the
individual's privacy rights. Quarantine under such conditions in the
United States would violate the fourteenth amendment right to privacy.
The privacy right also may protect AIDS carriers from quarantine
laws that require public disclosure of their names or the names of their
sexual partners.3 2 The English AIDS quarantine measure does stop
short of requiring disclosure of the names of AIDS patients.3 2 6 Unlike
the English law, however, Connecticut's quarantine measures contain no
provisions to prevent disclosure of names, and arguably could require
it.327 California's Health Department proposal would disclose names to
allow counseling groups to contact patients, which may violate a pa-
tient's privacy rights.3 28 Posting a placard at a patient's home would nec-
essarily violate privacy;329 moreover, no compelling need would be
satisfied by such a measure.
D. Practical Problems
Aside from the constitutional issues raised by application of quaran-
tine laws to AIDS patients in the United States, these laws also present a
321. See supra note 219.
322. See supra note 212.
323. See supra note 82.
324. See supra notes 229-232 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 220-222 and accompanying text. Although English common-law pri-
vacy cases have not explicitly found a privacy interest in sexual relationships, English courts
may consider the patient's privacy interests before ordering quarantine. See supra notes 133-
136 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 229-232 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 257-259 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 246-249 and accompanying text.
329. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
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host of practical problems that must be considered.3"' Knowledge of the
disease is increasing more rapidly than medical literature can report it;
thus, people applying quarantine legislation may not have the informa-
tion necessary to make rational decisions. In addition, quarantine of any
significant percentage of AIDS patients would be cost-prohibitive to the
public,33 ' especially because quarantined persons will have lost the
means of financing their own care. The insurance industry estimates the
cost of the AIDS epidemic will be fifty billion dollars between 1986 and
1991.332 If AIDS patients are quarantined, these costs would skyrocket.
And because quarantine of AIDS patients would probably have little ef-
fect on the spread of the epidemic, 333 only a small savings in health care
costs would result. A report of the University of California projected
that, if the California AIDS initiative had passed, the state would have
incurred costs as high as nineteen billion dollars during the first year the
law was in effect.3 34
In addition to financial costs, quarantine laws necessarily present
social costs. Using antibody tests as a basis for quarantining individuals
has serious social consequences. Professor Novick observes that some
persons "who test positive, would look and feel well and their future
course of health cannot now be predicted. It would surely be inappropri-
ate to confine them to a hospital, and the social consequences of restrict-
ing their freedom could well be devastating to them and to society.
'335
Novick considers such consequences as the cost of health care, needs of
the patient's family, and loss of home and job. Furthermore, AIDS quar-
antine may be used as a social sanction to regulate homosexual behavior,
as the quarantine of prostitutes was used in the 1940s as a vice control
measure.
336
Finally, quarantine may have little or no effect on curbing the epi-
demic. The National Academy of Sciences flatly rejected a national
330. Novick, supra note 5, at 81-82, raises a number of issues that indicate the ramifications
of AIDS quarantine. This discussion of practical problems is largely based on his article.
331. A study of the economic impact of AIDS reported that the first 10,000 AIDS cases in
the United States resulted in $1.4 billion in hospital costs and $4.8 billion in lost wages. Rag-
sdale, Epidemic Economics-AIDS' Financial Toll, San Francisco Examiner, Jan. 19, 1986, at
D-l, cols. 1, 4.
332. Id. at D-1, col. 1.
333. See supra note 309 and accompanying text.
334. Rexroat, AIDS Law Would Be Costly, Study Says, San Francisco Chron., Aug. 13,
1986, at 7, col. 6. A more conservative estimate of seven billion dollars was projected by
legislative analysts. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 90, at 49.
335. Novick, supra note 5, at 82.
336. See supra notes 61-62, 178-186 and accompanying text.
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AIDS quarantine as a means for controlling the spread of AIDS.337 Its
report on AIDS concluded that quarantine would be of little help since
"those diagnosed with AIDS do not usually pose great danger."33
AIDS quarantine has been called "a practical and moral impossibility"
because "no conceivable quarantine system would be adequate, and
none, given the fearsome medical needs of AIDS patients, would be ethi-
cally acceptable." '339
VI. ALTERNATIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States Surgeon General and National Academy of Sci-
ences have stressed that education programs are the most effective tool
for curbing the spread of AIDS.3'" Wide-ranging efforts to urge the
public to use safe sex practices and refrain from sharing needles are pres-
ently the only viable way to stop transmission from people who harbor
the virus.
Furthermore, counseling recalcitrant patients is a reasonable alter-
native to quarantine. It is conceivable that some individuals would re-
fuse to change their unsafe sexual behavior, but implementing quarantine
procedures to handle these individuals poses serious risks to fundamental
rights of the vast majority of other AIDS carriers. The dangers to liberty
and potential for arbitrary applications of the laws (as in the English
case) outweigh the benefit to the public.
Nevertheless, if quarantine is implemented for those exceptional
cases, the laws must be narrowly drawn and require rigid procedural
safeguards to ensure that only those exceptional persons are affected.
There must be documented evidence of unsafe sexual practices with un-
knowing partners.341 Patients must have: the right to representation by
counsel who are preferably experienced advocates of AIDS patients; a
prompt hearing requiring clear and convicing evidence of probable cause
to detain; and frequent review of the situation to determine if detention
remains necessary. In addition, quarantine administrators and judges or
juries hearing cases must receive regularly updated medical information.
337. Grim Prospects, supra note 74, at 21.
338. Id.
339. Future Shock, supra note 100, at 34.
340. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 82, at 6, 28-29, 31; Church, supra note 68,
at 19.
341. This evidence must be obtained in a manner such that privacy rights are not violated.
As the impetus for AIDS quarantine came from publicized reports of AIDS patients who
would not refrain from unsafe sex, AIDS quarantine should be limited to those cases where
health authorities obtain this information without surreptitious observation of private
behavior.
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Finally, review boards composed of physicians, public health experts,
lawyers, civil rights advocates, public health department representatives,
and citizens should be formed to assess the fairness and effectiveness of
the procedures, 342 and to advise the legislatures and courts of necessary
changes.
The necessity for such detailed procedures and safeguards must not
be overlooked for the sake of convenience or efficiency in handling a
"public emergency." Quarantining persons other than those "excep-
tional cases" because it is "impossible to bring about an immediate segre-
gation" of the dangerous from the nondangerous 343 would be an obvious
violation of equal protection and due process. As Justice Murphy stated
in his dissenting opinion in Korematsu, "Any inconvenience that may
[accompany] an attempt to conform to procedural due process cannot be




Since ancient times, quarantine has been used to control disease.
Although it was often effective in checking the spread of deadly
epidemics, quarantine was also used to vent public fear and prejudice and
bore little relationship to scientific evidence. With the advance of sci-
ence, however, the power of the governments of England and the United
States to make useful public health regulations based on accurate scien-
tific information and to institute quarantine measures, when required,
has become extensive. The strengthening of constitutional rights in the
United States during the last century has checked this power somewhat,
and American courts must balance the rights of individuals with the gov-
ernment's interest in safeguarding the public health.
Because AIDS is not transmitted by casual contact, measures to
quarantine AIDS victims should not be imposed in the same way as
quarantine of other contagious diseases. While England's AIDS quaran-
tine measures were intended to account for the different mode of AIDS
transmission, implementation of these measures has indicated that the
British attempt to legislate an effective and rational AIDS quarantine has
failed. Because England's law has no reasonable standards or adequate
safeguards to protect the patient's rights or to determine the actual dan-
ger to public health, the English law would violate American constitu-
tional guarantees of equal protection, substantive and procedural due
342. Novick, supra note 5, at 81-82.
343. Cf Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1944).
344. Id. at 242.
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process, and privacy. Although United States laws proposed to quaran-
tine AIDS patients may provide some procedural safeguards, the inabil-
ity to assess accurately infectiousness, the danger of isolating groups as a
social sanction, and the ineffectiveness of quarantine in limiting the
spread of AIDS create serious unresolved problems with AIDS quaran-
tine laws. Counseling recalcitrant patients and education programs for
the public to inform, to minimize hysteria, and to reduce unsafe behavior
are the reasonable and less restrictive alternatives.

